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The Emulating Interview… with Rick Grush
Przemysław Nowakowski
Przemysław Nowakowski:  Could you briefly describe your conception 
of emulation? Do you think it can provide basics not only for a theory of 
perception, but also – for instance – for a conception or an inference? 
Rick   Grush:  My   conception   of   emulation   is   fairly   simple:   emulation 
is representing something by using a model to stand in for it. This happens all 
the time: we use flight simulators as models for airplanes, we use chess 
boards to try out moves before we commit to making our official move. What 
these cases have in common is that some active agent is interacting with one 
thing, a model or emulator, in the same way that it would interact with 
something else, the represented entity. You interact with a flight simulator 
the same way you would interact with a real aircraft, you interact with the 
unofficial chess board (the one you use for trying out moves) in the same way 
you would interact with the official chess board.
The basic idea is that this phenomenon applies also to the brain itself – it 
constructs models of the body or the environment that it can then interact 
with in order to represent the body or environment.
There are many complications beyond this simple idea, of course, such as 
what things are modeled, how models are built and what it means to use 
something ‘in the same way’ as something else.
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As for the second part of the question, yes, I think there is an application for 
conception and inference. Obviously one common use of a model is precisely 
to make inferences – the reason I try out possible moves on a ‘model’ board is 
it to draw inferences about what moves might be good or bad if I were to try 
them out for real. Of course the model by itself doesn’t make the inference, 
I have to know how to use the model correctly, and I have to interpret the 
results correctly -- I can’t take the result of a possible move I try to be 
a memory of some past state of the chess board, or a perception of its current 
state, or a guess as to the state of a different board. I have to know, in some 
sense,   that   in   this   situation   the   state   of   the   model   is   representing 
a hypothetical state of affairs, and this is not something that the model itself 
makes apparent.
As for conception, I don’t know. Addressing this topic would take a long time. 
Let me just say that I believe that articulated emulators can be usefully taken 
to be conceptual, in the sense that the articulants have many features of 
concepts. But I won’t go into this any further. The issue of what concepts are 
is a tricky one, and to be honest, one that I am not that interested in getting 
mired in.
You seem to criticize enactivism quite often. How would you, then, place 
your conception of emulation among the ideas of enaction, embodiment 
or situated cognition? 
What these views and mine have in common is in their departure from 
certain ways of thinking about cognition and representation. We don’t view 
cognition and representation as primarily a matter of logic, or language like 
strings of symbols, and we take cognition to be connected to and based upon 
embodied motor engagement.
The main difference is that these other views are often anti-representational 
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My   own   position   is   that   given   an   appropriate   understanding   of   what 
representations are, (not sentences, but, more like models), we can make 
perfect sense of the idea that the brain represents. Furthermore, this notion 
of representation is as connected if not even more so to motor behavior than 
the other views. It also shows how representation and cognition can all take 
place entirely in the brain. I’m not saying it always does: we can and often do 
use external models. My point is weaker. Namely, that representation and 
cognition are often internal to the brain.
Do you see room in your conception of emulation for any special idea of 
bodily awareness?
The short answer is yes, of course. One of the main areas for application 
of the emulation theory concerns emulators of the body, and so in fact I do 
believe that body awareness involves emulators.
How are emulators in the body involved in one’s bodily awareness? 
When I work on role of the body in cognition, I find that the same body 
emulator is involved in cognition, the perception of objects and others, 
and also in bodily awareness. What do you think about this? Do you work 
on this question? Are you in a position to give a more detailed response 
to this phenomenon?
Motor   emulators   contribute  to  bodily   awareness  in  the  same  way  any 
emulator   contributes   to   awareness,   like   an   environment   emulator 
contributes to awareness of the environment. If perception is a controlled 
hallucination process, then there is no perception without hallucination, no 
perceptual   awareness   without   hallucination.   Emulators   are   what   the 
hallucination is made of. That emulator is running, and this is what we are 
aware of. It counts as perception, as opposed to imagery, if the hallucination 
is controlled by sensory inputs. If it is not, it is imagery or something else 
other than perception. The story is the same regardless of domain, body 
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It is not typical for an American philosopher and cognitive scientist to be 
interested in Husserl’s works. You yourself refer to Husserl, and not to 
works of American phenomenologists, like Dorion Cairns. Can you tell us 
why you have been inspired by Husserl?
Several years ago I became interested in the topic of temporal representation. 
I began to see how I might address this sort of representation from within my 
emulation framework. This required significant refinement and extension of 
the emulation theory itself, of course.
That was the theoretical cognitive neuroscience end. Of course I also wanted 
my   position  to  be  philosophically  responsible,  and  as   a  matter  of fact 
Husserl’s work on time consciousness is probably the single most important 
investigation of this topic in the history of philosophy.
I don’t think it is that unusual for American philosophers of cognitive science 
to be interested in Husserl. In fact, it has become somewhat trendy the last 10 
or 15 years. The problem is that in most of these cases Husserl is treated very 
superficially. But my goal was not to be trendy, but rather to gain some real 
insight, and this requires taking the original texts seriously. I’m not saying 
I agree with everything Husserl says. Of course not. But his work is deep and 
groundbreaking, and one gains a lot by really learning the thoughts of 
someone of this magnitude. For me, it is a valuable starting point.
In the previous version of your web page you named your view – quite 
boldly and interestingly – transcendental idealism (a neuronal version). 
This name however didn’t show up in next versions of the page – have 
you changed your opinion on that? 
No, I haven’t changed my opinion of that. I consider myself a transcendental 
idealist. Though that phrase means different things to different people. What 
I mean is simply the idea that the world  as we experience it  is largely 
a construction.   I   am   not   a   direct   realist.   This,   by   the   way,   is   another 
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people.   They   tend   to   be   direct   realists   (as   part   of   their   anti-
representationalism). 
Some people tend to equate transcendental idealism with a very radical 
metaphysics, and I don’t think it is necessarily that radical. For example, if we 
take modern physics seriously, then the universe as physics says it is is very 
dissimilar to, even in its most basic structure, the way we experience it as 
being. 
What is your opinion about the role of philosophy in science? Would you 
agree with the suggestion that in light of the present state of science, 
philosophy has nothing less, if not even more to do? What in your view 
has philosophy today to offer the field of cognitive science, and what 
kind of philosophy would you suggest here?
I think philosophy has a huge role to play. First off, I realize that it is very 
common these days for philosophers to defer to scientists about many things, 
but my own experience is that scientists themselves are quite fallible, and are 
often not the best sources for understanding even their own results. For 
example, my BBS article from a few years ago had scientists as commentators, 
and a good many of them made horrible errors of reasoning, failed to 
understand the relation between what I was saying and their own work, and 
were generally confused. Not all of them of course. But the point is that just 
because someone is a scientist, it does not follow that what they are saying, 
even when it comes to their own work, is right or even makes sense.
There will always be a role for conceptually clear thinking about any topic, 
including empirical work. And in some cases at least, philosophers can 
contribute to this endeavor.
Second, scientists are often unaware of issues that philosophers have good 
training   in.   To   take   one   interesting   example,   psychologists   and 
neuroscientists do not ask, and in fact don’t even understand, the question: 
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puzzled. If you ask a biologist what life is, they understand the question 
perfectly. They don’t give you an easy answer, because it is a complicated 
question that doesn’t admit of an easy answer. But the point is that they know 
perfectly well what the question is. 
But psychology, etymologically the study of the mind, has lost sight of the 
mind. They study things that minds do, such as vision, or how many items 
can be held in short term memory. But blind people have minds, and having 
a smaller or greater short term memory capacity doesn’t remove one’s mind. 
So these studies aren’t telling us anything about what minds are. This is, 
I suppose, a philosophical question. Certainly it is theoretical, and at the very 
theoretical end of the continuum, far away from empirical. 
There   have   been   different   interpretations   of   amodal   emulators. 
Sometimes they are understood as motorical emulators and other times 
they are understood as providing some kind of conceptual information. 
How would you respond to this?
I’m not sure what to say about things being ‘conceptual’. This means so many 
different   things   to   different   people   that   no   matter   what   I   say   I’ll   be 
misunderstood. So I hereby pass on the question.
OK. We want to know what make emulators amodal? You can think of 
concepts in the Fodorian sense of concepts.
I take it that calling an emulator "motor" is a specification about what it is 
representing -- it is representing some aspect of the motor system, like bodily 
dynamics.
But on my theory, whether an emulator is modal or amodal is not a matter of 
what it is representing. It is a matter of whether it is representing the target 
domain, whatever it is, in terms of some modality of sensory input or not. 
So a motor emulator would be modal if it is representing the motor system 
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if   it   is   representing   it   in   terms   of   joint   angles   and   muscle   tensions 
or whatever,   and   then   the   motor   imagery   was   produced   from   this   by 
a separate system that translated the amodal representation into a modal 
input.
So  on  my   account,   being   amodal  does   not   necessarily   mean  motor   or 
conceptual. It means specifically that it is not in terms of a specific modality 
of input.
Consider the representations that a flight simulator uses in its computing 
software. Those representations are not modal, and it is also not obvious to 
me that they are conceptual or motor. They are representations of the 
position and speed, of the virtual aircraft, plus the environment, wind speed 
and weather etc. This information is then translated into various modal 
terms; as a video display that the pilot in the simulator uses, instrument 
readings, and so on and so forth.
I think one reason people find my usage of the term confusing is that most 
people equate “modal” with “perceptual”. But I think this is a mistake. As 
I use the terms, modal means tied to a given sensory modality, like vision or 
audition. But on my view, much of what we perceive is not coming directly 
from a modality. We perceive causation, for example, but all vision actually 
provides is one colored shape contacting another colored shape. As you can 
see, I am Kantian. As for Kant, the Categories are not modal, they are not 
given to experience through the senses. But they are part of perception. How? 
Because they are provided by the mind. They are perceptual in the sense that 
they are part of our perceptual content, space, time, causation. But they are 
not modal (as I use the term) because they are not provided through any 
particular sensory modality.
How do you understand the difference between amodal and multimodal 
information? Speaking more generally, is it possible to interpret the 
results of research on multimodal perception in fields concerned with 
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Here’s an analogy based on video games. Some video games are designed 
such that the computations under the hood are in terms of the very things 
that are presented visually. Pong or Pac-Man, for example, represents the 
domain as a 2 dimensional space, and this translates directly into the scene 
presented to the player. But consider contemporary games, like Halo or 
Counter-Strike. In this case, the representations computed by the game 
engine are about what objects are where they are in a 3 dimensional space. 
This includes where the player is and how the player is oriented, what those 
objects are doing, and so forth. A separate mechanism then has the job of 
taking this representation at any instant and deciding what things look like 
and sound like from the player’s point of view. And this is then presented on 
the screen and through the speakers. 
My description takes the game engine of Pong as modal. It computes and 
represents what is happening in the realm of the game with the visual 
schema that the player is presented with in the visual modality. Halo, by 
contrast, has an amodal engine. The computations that determine what is 
happening   in   the   game   realm   are   not   based   on   a   visual   or   auditory 
representation of the scene. They are based on objects being at specific 
locations and doing things at those locations. This is not represented modally 
at all. It is largely spatial, things are assigned locations in 3 dimensional 
space. But it is not visual or auditory. 
A multi-modal system would be one that lacks an amodal representation, but 
supports more than one modality by mapping directly from one modal 
representation to a different modal representation, without ever constructing 
or using something that isn’t in one modal format or another.
Do you regard the mind-body problem (relation) as still a crucial issue 
in the domain of cognition? 
No. I think it’s an interesting metaphysical problem. For example, I believe 
that the mind is an abstract entity defined implicitly by the contents it graspes 
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of course there are many differences). And so on my view, it is a mistake to 
identify the brain with the mind. But this doesn’t impact what I think about 
cognition. As far as issues about cognition and problem solving go, they can 
be studied apart form these metaphysical issues.
I believe that cognition is often extended, but this is trivial. It’s been known 
for millennia that problems are usually solved with external aids, and if 
cognition is problem solving, then it’s often extended. The subject though, or, 
one’s mind, well that’s different. But my views on that are for another day. 
One of my doctoral students, Amanda Brovold, is writing a dissertation on 
subjectivity right now. It is very interesting work.
Some researchers (like Wolpert) integrate the studies on the conception 
of Kalman’s filters in motor control with Bayesian ideas. Do you see 
a place for Bayesian ideas in the conception of emulation? 
They   are   closely   connected.   A   Kalman   filter   is   one  way   to  implement 
Bayesianism. It is Bayes applied to filtering. The prior is provided by a model 
of the system producing the signal.  More could be said about this but the 
basic idea is that are closely related, and in some applications just two 
different ways of expressing the same thing. Though it should be noted that 
not all application of Bayes are kalman filters.
Once I was describing the conception of emulation during a seminar, and 
I   was   asked   about   the   relation   between   emulation   and   attentional 
processes.   Wouldn’t   you   agree   that   emulation   and   attention   play 
a similar functional role in the process of filtrating information? 
Possibly. Though I believe that there is a lot of emulation going on that is not 
in focal attention, and some that never is in focal attention. Though it is 
possible that attention could be the marshalling of a certain sort of emulation 
process. I think there is some promise to that idea, but I’m not in a position to 
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In your BBS text you refer to an articulated model and associative 
memory in the context of emulators’ functioning. But don’t you think 
that for emulation to work, it needs to be linked to more complex 
conception of memory? 
Not at all. One way to implement an emulator is to simply remember a large 
number of past input-output mappings, and then when one encounters a new 
input, just produce the associated output. Such an emulator won’t be very 
flexible, of course. But it might be very fast and relatively easy to learn. Other 
emulators might be linked to more complex sorts of memory, too, and those 
might have different sets of advantages and disadvantages.
One popular area of interest in contemporary neuro-cognitive literature 
is   to   do   with   representations   in   and   of   the   body.   An   important 
phenomenon here seems to be what we could describe as “out-of-body 
experience’s”, which are linked to the damage of the temporo-parietal 
junction. An important consequence of this disorder also engages with 
the vestibular system. Do you think there is any chance that this system 
can contribute to the conception of emulation, and do you see any role of 
emulation in explaining OBE? 
Definitely, though it would take a long time to treat this in detail. The doctoral 
student I mentioned above, Brovold, is working on themes closely related to 
this. When her dissertation is finished then I’ll know what I think about this 
topic!
What role do emotions play in conceptions of motor cognition?
I’m not sure emotions play much of a role in motor cognition. At least not an 
interesting role as far as I can tell. Though I think emulation plays a large role 
in   emotion.   For   example,   Damasio’s   as-if   loops   are   degenerate   cases 
of emulators. They are simply forward models. But if we enrich his notion of 
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a much richer account of what is happening. One of my former PhD students, 
Lisa Damm, wrote a dissertation on this issue, actually. It may be something 
she and I co-author something on in the future.
Say you hear a somewhat shallow remark about your conclusions: “but 
this is not about the PEOPLE…’ . Could you suggest any similarly simple 
but witty riposte?
Well, I do hear that from time to time, and my reply is that sometimes the 
point is correct and sometimes it is incorrect. When I purposefully engage in 
imagery to imagine possible courses of action, or use an external chess board 
to try out possible moves, then it is I, the person, who is engaing in emulation 
processes. But when there are emulators in my brain of, for example, bodily 
dynamics used to guide fast goal directed movements, then I, the person, am 
not doing the emulation. I am just trying to move my arm and grasp the cup, 
subpersonal mechanisms are doing the emulating.
That’s not very witty or pithy, I guess, but that is my take on that issue.
What would be the role of emulation in the perception of music? And 
could you tell us what kind of music you like listening in your spare 
time? 
I’m not entirely sure whether emulation plays a key role in the appreciation 
of music in general. Obviously prediction does – the experience of music is 
clearly related, to some extent, to one’s ability to predict what will happen. 
Among many other things too, of course. Perhaps the greatest connection 
would be with people who are musicians or composers themselves, since 
those people would have more developed internal models of the process of 
music creation. But this is purely speculation. What role emulation plays in 
music appreciation is an interesting topic, but not one I have much to say 
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As to what sort of music I listen to, I find that I am more drawn to certain 
artists than specific genres. Within any genre, there are artists and pieces 
I like and artists and pieces I don’t. But to give you some examples: I like 
Stravinski, Chopin, Allen Holdsworth, Ani DiFranco, Tool, Nine Inch Nails, 
Eisbrecher (I’m listening to their album Sünde as I write this, in fact), Public 
Enemy, Coldplay. I could go on and on. Music is a big passion of mine.
Thank you for your answers!